I want to wrap up the discussion about the Portland “startup tax” with a focus on Portland investors. My last post outlined mistakes Portland entrepreneurs often make. Now I want to focus on bad investor behavior.
Most investors I’ve met in Portland have a horror story about getting stuck in a company that ends up going nowhere. Or, being in a growing company but getting washed out on a later round. This has lead to a number of investor behaviors that often prevent good companies from getting access to growth capital.
Early stage Silicon Valley investors have developed entrepreneurial friendly investing behaviors that coupled with lean startup methodologies have proved extremely successful. Many of Portland’s bad investment habits hobble Portland entrepreneurs and add to the Portland startup tax. Here are a few practices Portland investors need to adopt to lower the tax.
Too many Portland investors see virtue in time consuming comprehensive diligence. Traditional business diligence looses its relevance with nimble, agile and lean early stage startups. Scouring existing financials and forecasts has limited relevance in a lean startup that depends on speed and agility. Plus the distraction to the founding team is costly.
Investors should invest in areas in which they have knowledge and are comfortable. It’s most productive to limit early diligence to the market space and the team. Most oving quickly and helping founders focus on the business.
Many Portland investors are drawn to contingent funding. Forcing entrepreneurs to find additional funds is too often viewed as a test that lowers risk. I’ve seen several instances when entrepreneurs tie themselves up for months trying to find additional investment dollars so they can take down contingent investments. Rather than test, this can kill a company by exhausting entrepreneurs and delaying execution. If a company needs more money that an investor can supply than the investors should do their share to syndicate the deal.
Set Reasonable Valuations and Caps
Portland investors often force low valuations because they can. But, this can be counter-productive. Too much early low valuation money crowds a cap table scaring off later stage capital. Later rounds that leave the founders with too little ownership increase the execution risk (by demotivating and distracting the founders), limiting the upside for everyone. In Portland, this often drives early sales of companies even when they have tremendous growth potential.
Forcing low caps on notes is the same as setting too low a valuation. The idea of a note is to avoid pricing a round before there’s enough business to value. Investors should either use a note as intended – a quick lightweight way to bridge a company forward (with discounts and interest as the incentive). Or, they should price a Series Seed round. The cap should merely protect an investor from not appropriately participating in extraordinary appreciation. A note with a low cap can either telegraph a low valuation for a subsequent round or scare off investors with a inappropriate differential in share price.
Keep Terms Simple
Funding terms only get worse in subsequent rounds. Early multiples of participation, ratchets, anti-dilution ratchets and other onerous terms rarely ever go away. And although they may seem to favor investors, they can encumber companies and compromise the ability to raise needed capital and restrict strategic options. Early investors are most successful when they align their interests with the entrepreneur’s.
Portland’s seed and angel investors need to better partner with entrepreneurs. Putting a company in a position to find the best future investors optimizes returns for everyone. All behavior that slows a company, or attempts to protect the early investor from the entrepreneur essentially increases the Portland startup tax and limits everyone’s upside.